Optimal Learning in Coordination Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games by Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee for it to be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task.
منابع مشابه
An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games
This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complex...
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