A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies
نویسنده
چکیده
In this note we show that the results developed in Singh and Vives (1984) are sensitive to the duopoly assumption (Rand Journal of Economics 15, 546-554). If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition. Hence, it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient. JEL Classification: D43, L13
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 93 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000