Intentional Omissions

Often when one omits to do a certain thing, one’s omission is due to one’s simply not having considered, or one’s having forgotten, to do that thing. When this is so, one does not intentionally omit to do that thing. But sometimes one intentionally omits to do something. For example, Ann was asked by Bob to pick him up at the airport at 2:30 am, after his arrival at 2:00. Feeling tired and knowing that Bob can take a taxi, Ann decides at midnight not to pick him up at 2:30, and she intentionally omits to do so. Other examples of intentional omissions include instances of abstaining, boycotting, and fasting.1 Intentional omissions would seem to have much in common with intentional actions. But the extent of the similarity is not immediately obvious. Intentional omission has been recognized as a problem for theories of agency, but it is one on which, especially lately, little effort has been expended. My aim here is to advance a conception of intentional omission, address a number of claims that have been made about it, and examine the extent to which an account of it should parallel an account of intentional action. I’ll argue that although there might indeed be interesting differences, there are nevertheless important similarities, and similarities that support a causal approach to agency. Although much of our interest in omissions concerns responsibility for omitting, my focus is on the metaphysical and mental dimensions of intentional omission.What sort of thing (if it is a thing at all) is an omission?What, if any, mental states or events must figure in cases of intentional omission, and how must they figure? Answers to these questions have some bearing on the moral issue, but the questions are interesting in their own right. And they stand in some degree of mutual independence from the moral issue, as there can be intentional omissions for which no one is responsible, and (on