Walras–lindahl–wicksell: What Equilibrium Concept for Public Goods Provision? the Convex Case
نویسنده
چکیده
Despite the large number of its references, this paper is less a survey than a systematic exposition, in an unifying framework, of the different equilibrium concepts elaborated for studying provision of public goods. Assuming convexity as well on the consumption side as on the production side, It studies their existence and their optimality properties, and also their limits for founding public policy of market economies.
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