Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability Forthcoming in Analysis
نویسنده
چکیده
In TM, the term non-alethic facts means facts that have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of sentences, like the fact that snow is white. The solution I propose works this way. Call being grounded the property a sentence S has when it has a truthor falsity-maker that is a non-alethic fact, and ungrounded the property S has when it lacks such a truthor falsitymaker. A common view about paradoxical sentences, for example, L, is that they are ungrounded and thus, given TM, that they lack truth-value:
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تاریخ انتشار 2013