Phenomenology and Intentionality

Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states which is not established by Horgan and Tienson’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content / fixer of truth conditions. Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. They support this claim with an argument designed to show that certain intentional states are fixed by phenomenal states. However, in this paper we argue that what Horgan and Tienson (hereafter HT) call phenomenal intentionality requires a certain kind of correlation of phenomenal states and phenomenal intentional states, which HT do not present arguments for. Furthermore, we suggest, accepting the stronger equivalence claim necessary to make phenomenal intentionality plausible would entail combining the principle of phenomenal intentionality with some form of representationalist theory of consciousness, and so calling into question the putative priority of the phenomenal. HT extend their principle of phenomenal intentionality beyond perceptual belief to conscious cognitive states more generally, such as beliefs (hopes, fears, etc.) about what is for dinner tonight. We argue that, whatever