Yuichi Yamamoto “ Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games ” PIER Working Paper 12 - 044
نویسنده
چکیده
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time, but cannot observe what the opponent learns. We show that there are robust equilibria where players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a “belief-free” equilibrium. The result is applied to various examples, including secret pricecutting with unknown demand. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
منابع مشابه
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Individual Learning
We study repeated games where players observe noisy private signals about the unknown state of the world in every period. We find a sufficient condition under which the folk theorem obtains by ex-post equilibria. Our condition is satisfied for generic signal distributions as long as each player has at least two possible private signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72...
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