Sense, Reference and Selective Attention

he idea that there is a distinction between propositional and Ti magistic content is familiar and compelling, but it brings with it a problem. The problem is to explain the relation between the two types of content. This problem can seem so difficult that to escape it, you would abandon the propositional/imagistic distinction. But that is an extreme reaction; we can solve the problem. My proposal in this paper is that the primary mechanism for mediating between propositional and imagistic content is perceptual attention. Propositional content involves reference to objects. There are many ways in which we can refer to concrete objects, but the most basic sort of reference is when you can see the thing, or perceive it somehow, and refer to it on the strength of that perception. If you and I are looking out of the window, then we may discuss the castle before us, identifying it as 'that castle', the one we can see. But just having the castle in your field of view does not seem to be enough for you to refer to it. If you are to refer to the castle, you must do more than have it your field of view: you must attend to the thing. And if you are to talk to me about that castle, you have to draw my attention to it, so I get some clue as to what you are talking about. Reference on the basis of perception seems to depend on the ability to attend to the things perceived. Reference and attention are related phenomena. Attention, as I am conceiving of it, is a matter of selection: you select some aspects of your perception rather than others. One basis for selection is perceived location: you may select the phenomena perceived at a single location. Selection on the basis of location is what I shall be calling spatial attention. Perceptual reference can depend on spatial attention. The best way for you to let me know what you are talking about may be to point to where the castle is. But there are other bases for attention, as when you and I listen to