Fitch’s Paradox and the Problem of Shared Content
نویسندگان
چکیده
a 3 : 1 pp. 74 – 86, 2006 FITCH’S PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF SHARED CONTENT
منابع مشابه
Thomas Bradwardine and Epistemic Paradox∗
The most famous epistemic paradox is Fitch’s paradox. In it, Frederic Fitch offered a counterexample to the Principle of Knowability (PK), namely, that any true proposition can be known. His example is the proposition that some proposition is true but not known. This proposition is not paradoxical or contradictory in itself, but contradicts (PK), which many have found appealing. What is really ...
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The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument which states that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are actually known. In 1963 Frederich Fitch published ‘A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts’[3]. This brief article appeared on the Journal of Symbolic Logic and it immediately became a classic of philosophical logic. It is in this paper that Fitch presented the Knowability Paradox, ...
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