Other-Regarding Preferences with Player-Dependent Coefficients
نویسنده
چکیده
Using a system of axioms, this paper develops a general utility model of other-regarding preferences when opponents are unfamiliar, but they are not strictly anonymous in the sense that they may share some history. Based on two key axioms, an individual’s preferences over a vector of probability distributions are additively separable in the decision maker’s own outcome and each opponent’s outcome, has an expected utility representation, and is expressed entirely in terms of the decision maker’s utility function. The resulting specification allows the weights placed on the opponents’ outcomes to be player dependent. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72, D81
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