A quantum extension to inspection game
نویسندگان
چکیده
X iv :1 50 7. 07 95 1v 1 [ cs .G T ] 2 8 Ju l 2 01 5 A quantum extension to inspection game Xinyang Deng, 2 Yong Deng, 3, a) Qi Liu, 4 and Zhen Wang 5, b) School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China Center for Quantitative Sciences, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN 37232, USA School of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA Department of Biomedical Informatics, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, TN 37232, USA Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
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عنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1507.07951 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015