Road-side units operators in competition: A game-theoretical approach

We study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework tomodel the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishlymaximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases. Our game-theoretical analysis gives insights on the outcomes of the competition between vehicular Internet providers, further highlighting some counter-intuitive behaviors; as an example, comparing with the case when users have constant price valuation over time, having users inclined to increasing their “acceptable” price may force vehicle Internet providers to charge lower prices due to competition. © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.