Chambers of Arrangements of Hyperplanes and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
نویسنده
چکیده
Let A be a nonempty real central arrangement of hyperplanes and Ch be the set of chambers of A. Each hyperplane H defines a half-space H and the other half-space H. Let B = {+,−}. For H ∈ A, define a map ǫ H : Ch → B by ǫ H (C) = + (if C ⊆ H) and ǫ H (C) = − (if C ⊆ H). Define ǫ H = −ǫ H . Let Ch = Ch×Ch× · · · ×Ch (m times). Then the maps ǫ H induce the maps ǫ H : Ch → B. We will study the admissible maps Φ : Ch → Ch which are compatible with every ǫ H . Suppose |A| ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2. Then we will show that A is indecomposable if and only if every admissible map is a projection to a component. When A is a braid arrangement, which is indecomposable, this result is equivalent to Arrow’s impossibility theorem in economics. We also determine the set of admissible maps explicitly for every nonempty real central arrangement.
منابع مشابه
Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian framework of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it with Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This note explores these two directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and...
متن کاملAn impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
Amalgamating evidence of different kinds for the same hypothesis into an overall confirmation is analogous, I argue, to amalgamating individuals’ preferences into a group preference. The latter faces well-known impossibility theorems, most famously “Arrow’s Theorem”. Once the analogy between amalgamating evidence and amalgamating preferences is tight, it is obvious that amalgamating evidence mi...
متن کاملArrow’s Theorem as a Corollary
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is derived from a general theorem on social aggregation in “property spaces”. In the present proof, the weak-order structure of the domain and co-domain of the aggregation plays a purely combinatorial role.
متن کاملQuantum voting and violation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Abstract We propose a quantum voting system in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma. Our scheme violates a quantum analogue of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, which states that every (classical) constitution endowed with three innocuous-seeming properties is a dictatorship. Superpositions, interference, and entanglement of votes feature in voting tactics available t...
متن کاملArrovian Impossibilities in Aggregating Preferences over Sets
Given a society confronting a set of alternatives A, we consider the aggregation of individual preferences over the power set A of A into a social preference over A. In case we allow individuals to have any complete and transitive preference over A, Arrow’s impossibility theorem naturally applies. However, the Arrovian impossibility prevails, even when the set of admissible preferences over A i...
متن کامل