Scientific Communication and Cognitive Codification: Social Systems Theory and SSK

The intellectual organization of the sciences cannot be appreciated sufficiently unless the cognitive dimension is considered as an independent source of variance. Cognitive structures interact and co-construct the organization of scholars and discourses into research programs, specialties, and disciplines. In the sociology of scientific knowledge and the sociology of translation, these heterogeneous sources of variance have been homogenized a priori in the concepts of practices and actor-networks. Practices and actor-networks, however, can be explained in terms of the selforganization of the cognitive code in scientific communication. The code selects knowledge claims by organizing them operationally in the various discourses; the claims can thus be stabilized and potentially globalized. Both the selecting codes and the variation in the knowledge claims remain constructed, but the different subdynamics can be expected to operate asymmetrically and to update with other frequencies. Practices and the Pansemiosis of Actor-Networks In his seminal study of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), David Bloor noted that ‘knowledge for the sociologist is whatever men take to be knowledge’ (1976: 2). Consequently, this ‘strong program’ in the sociology of science introduced a principle of symmetry into explanation: a sociological explanation in terms of human beliefs should be able to explain both true and false knowledge. From this perspective, scientific knowledge can no longer to be defined as ‘true’ belief, and therefore different from other knowledge (Barnes, 1974). In the case of mathematics, Bloor (1982) argued that even rules of logical inference derive their truth from social negotiation and human belief. The strong program extended on Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) notion of a paradigm as a language game (Winch, 1958; Barnes, 1969): in practices the cognitive is always social, and vice versa. The dimensions of the cognitive and the social are integrated and cannot be distinguished; socio-cognitive (inter-)actions shape the social and the cognitive at the same time (Collins, 1983). Therefore, analysis should not be pursued in terms of dimensions like ‘cognitive’ versus ‘social’ or ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ (Callon et al., 1983). SSK has not accepted any ex ante disciplinary division of labor among the history, philosophy, or sociology of science in terms of their subject matter. In comparison with older traditions in the sociology of science (Merton, 1942; 1973), this focus led to descriptions of the world of science that were empirically richer than those provided by more traditional approaches in sociology and philosophy. For example, it was no longer possible to describe a specialty only in terms of the