Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms
نویسندگان
چکیده
We extend the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) to continuous actions. We show that there is a (constrained) efficient bimorphic equilibrium which is robust under evolutionary pressure. It consists of a cooperative strategy and a myopic defection strategy so that our model provides a foundation to incomplete information models as well.
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