Better to exist: a reply to Benatar.

Against moral theories: reply to Benatar.

D Benatar argues that in the author's recent article Moral theories in teaching applied ethics, the author overlooked important roles that could be played by moral theories in such teaching. In this reply, the cases that Benatar suggests are considered and for each an alternative approach is suggested that will avoid the costs discussed in the original paper and will also be a more effective re...

Grim news from the original position: a reply to Professor Doyal.

In his review of my book, Better never to have been, Len Doyal suggests, contrary to my view, that rational beings in the original position might prefer coming into existence to the alternative of never existing, if their lives were to include enough good and not too much bad. I argue, in response, that Professor Doyal fails to make his case.

Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar.

Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar's asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit--which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting--while questio...

A Problem in Avicennas View on the Origination of the Soul and a Reply to It

David Benatar . Better Never To Have Been : The Harm of Coming into Existence ( Oxford : Oxford University

In this book, David Benatar argues that every person is severely harmed by being brought into existence, and that in bringing any person into existence one impermissibly harms that person. His conclusion is not merely that by bringing a person into existence, one harms him. That claim is compatible with the claim that by bringing a person into existence, one also greatly benefits him, and even ...