Fairness and Utilitarianism without Independence

In this work we reconsider Harsanyi’s celebrated (1953, 1955, 1977) utilitarian impartial observer theorem. Departing from Harsanyi’s individual-centered approach, we argue that, when societal decisions are at stake, postulates must not be drawn from individualistic behavior. Rather, they should be based on societal norms. Hence, notions like societal fairness should explicitly be taken as the guiding principles. Continuing this line of thinking, we state and prove a utilitarian result that, rather than the independence assumption, is based on the notion of procedural fairness and on similar treatment of societal and individual lotteries. “An axiomatic justi…cation of utilitarianism would have more content to it if it started o¤ at a place somewhat more distinct from the ultimate destination”Sen (1976, page 251)