Behavior of Real Experts on Experimental Markets for Credence Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. JEL classifications: C91, D82, C72
منابع مشابه
Investigating the Behavior of Real Experts on Experimental Markets for Credence Goods
We compare the behavior of car mechanics and college students as sellers in experimental credence goods markets. Finding largely similar behavior, we note much more overtreatment by car mechanics, probably due to decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. JEL classifications: C91, D82, C72
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