Online Appendix for “Identifying Combinatorial Valuations from Aggregate Demand”
نویسندگان
چکیده
This Online Appendix addresses several issues mentioned but not discussed in depth in the paper. Section I discusses various extensions of the basic model. Section II shows that for our identification arguments, it is sufficient to observe aggregate demand where it is singlevalued. Section III provides a proof of part 3 of Proposition 4. Section IV provides an example that shows that the set of M \-concave valuations is not convex. Section V shows that our identification result for multi-unit demand (Theorem 2), which assumed at least two goods (n ≥ 2), would fail in the case of only a single good (n = 1). Section VI proves Theorem 2, our identification result for multi-unit demand. In order to maintain unique equation numbers, the numbering of equations in the Online Appendix does not start with (1), but rather starts with (67), which is where the numbering in the main paper left off. Similarly, the numbering of lemmas and propositions continues where the numbering in the main paper left off.
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Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
We study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions. In our setting, aggregate demand for each item is observable while demand for bundles is not. Neverthele...
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