Kant on Objects and Things

I show that Kant’s phrase Ding an sich denotes, not a type of thing, but a type of object: namely, an object which is per se a thing. My interpretation is based on the assumption that Kant follows the traditional use of the terms objectum and res. Kant’s distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is a distinction between types of object: a “distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena.”1 Specifically, it is a distinction between two ways in which an act of intellection can have an object: either mediately, via a faculty of sense, or immediately, via the intellect alone: Concepts can be logically compared without concerning oneself as to where their objects belong: whether as noumena for the intellect [Verstand ]2 or as phenomena for sensibility. If, however, we want to go with these concepts to their objects, then transcendental reflection is first necessary, [as to] for which cognitive power they are to be objects, whether for pure intellect or for sensibility. (KrV A269/B325) Since the same thing may be the object of different faculties, such a distinction between types of object may not correspond to any distinction between types of thing. 1Title of the third part of the Analytic of Principles, KrV A235/B294. 2Verstand is the standard German equivalent for νοῦς = ↪aql = intellectus. Since I will be tracing Kant’s terminology to Greek, Arabic, and Latin sources, it is convenient to translate Verstand as “intellect.” $Id: kant_objects_long.tex,v 3.3 2016/09/11 17:10:56 abestone Exp $