Truthful polynomial time optimal welfare keyword auctions with budget constraints
نویسنده
چکیده
In keyword auctions, advertisers bid for keywords. Currently, bids and allocations are made on a per keyword basis. We show that this mechanism is neither efficient nor truthful under demand or budget constraints and provide a truthful efficient (quasi) polynomial mechanism for allocating keywords under budget constraints. As a side effect our proposed mechanism has higher revenue than the current mechanism in use by search engines.
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