Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues such as the appropriate game form, existence and uniqueness of equilibria are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.
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