Schooling the Cognitive Monster: The Role of Motivation in the Regulation and Control of Prejudice

Motivation has been a central construct in theoretical and empirical efforts to understand the nature of prejudice and stereotyping. We briefly review core motivational underpinnings of prejudice and stereotyping, focusing on aspects of the human condition that help to explain why we are so prone to bias. The strong propensity toward stereotyping and prejudice along with the automatic manner in which intergroup biases often operate have led researchers to question the controllability of such biases (e.g., Bargh’s (1999) characterization of stereotyping as a ‘cognitive monster’ that could not be ‘chained’ through efforts at control). We revisit the issue of the controllability of stereotyping and prejudice in light of recent work examining the effects of motivations to control prejudice on regulatory processes. Although a top-down approach to regulation has been emphasized in much past work (e.g., the conscious replacement of prejudiced associations with more egalitarian thoughts), there is growing evidence that more automated and less effortful bottom-up regulation is also possible (i.e., a ‘schooling’ of the ‘cognitive monster’). Altogether, the accumulated evidence points to the limitations of dual-process approaches when applied to understanding the control and regulation of prejudiced responses. The evidence argues instead for a more complex, dynamic, and multi-level conceptualization of regulation. Motivational factors have always been central to the study of prejudice, and they are represented by opposing dual foci: those forces creating and sustaining bias, and those forces marshaled to regulate and control it. Thus, motivation is core both to the problem and solution of bias. Historically, many researchers have reached glum conclusions about the winner of this motivational fracas. For example, based on evidence available at the time of his writing, Bargh (1999) likened stereotypical biases to a ‘cognitive monster’ that could not be controlled, a conclusion much aligned with the idea that stereotyping and prejudice is inevitable. Our primary goal in this article is to review especially recent findings concerning the regulation and control of prejudice. We discuss theoretical and empirical developments related to people’s motivations to control their prejudice, 212 Motivation and the Regulation and Control of Prejudice © 2009 The Authors Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3/3 (2009): 211–226, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00177.x Journal Compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and then we consider the consequences of these motivations and the extent to which they ultimately facilitate the regulation and control. These findings shed new light on people’s abilities for and avenues of control, and they also call for a more complex, dynamic, and multi-level conceptualization of regulation – a conceptualization that suggests that the ‘monster’ might be successfully schooled. However, before discussing potential avenues for successful prejudice control, we begin with the problem. That is, precisely what are the forces for regulating and controlling prejudice up against? The Problem with Motivation Historically, much emphasis has been placed on certain core motives that operate across intra-individual, inter-individual, and intergroup contexts to encourage the development and operation of stereotyping and prejudice (see Fiske, 2000). To illustrate, we consider four core motives: the need to deal with cognitive overload and simplify complex information, to belong and be part of a group, to enhance and maintain feelings of selfworth, and to justify the status quo. The powerful drive to satisfy these fundamental human needs can create the building blocks of stereotyping and prejudice and fuel our reliance on them. Individuals’ motivation for simplification of the complex social world through categories, stereotypes, and prejudices has long been recognized. Allport (1954, p. 20) wrote of the human need to ‘think with the aid of categories’, and once categories are formed, biased generalizations and evaluations that favor members of our ingroups over members of outgroups often follow naturally. We are also motivated by our need for smooth relations with others, both interpersonally and between groups. The need to belong and to have frequent interactions that feel good to us have been described as fundamental human motivations (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Belonging to a group comes with tangible rewards, whereas exclusion from a group can come at a significant cost. The fundamental need to belong thus motivates the acquisition, expression, and internalization of stereotypes and prejudices – an idea that has theoretical roots in the Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Specifically, SIT posits that people identify with groups to which they belong and maintain a positive social identity by viewing one’s ingroups favorably, and that people derogate members of outgroups to enhance self-esteem. Threats to our ingroups, our way of life, and the values we hold dear also act as motivators to rely on stereotypes and exhibit prejudices. Not unconnected with the fundamental need to belong and to establish a positive social identity is the strong desire to maintain positive self-esteem. Self-esteem maintenance and protection are fundamental goals, and they can often lead to the use of stereotypes and to prejudice. Fein and Spencer