Fertility and Reproductive Preferences in Post-Transitional Societies

Conventional theories have little to say about the level at which fertility will stabilize at the end of the demographic transition, although it is often assumed that replacement fertility of about 2.1 births per woman will prevail in the long run. However, fertility has dropped below the replacement level in virtually every population that has moved through the transition. If future fertility remains at these low levels, populations will decline in size and will age rapidly. This paper examines the causes of discrepancies between reproductive preferences and observed fertility. Examples of such deviations are found in many contemporary developed countries, where desired family size is typically two children while fertility is well below replacement. Six factors are identified as the causes of these discrepancies. Of these factors, the fertility-depressing impact of the rising age at childbearing is one of the most important. This factor reduces fertility only as long as the age at childbearing keeps rising. Once the mean age stops rising—as it eventually must—fertility will rise closer to the desired level of two children, because the depressing effect is then removed. The current low levels of fertility in many developed countries may therefore not be permanent. This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from the author. The timing of the onset of contemporary fertility transitions and the pace of change during their early phases have been central concerns of researchers and policymakers in recent decades. Demographers and social scientists have studied survey data with detailed information about reproductive behaviors and attitudes of individuals in many countries. This research has provided new insights into the determinants of reproductive behavior and has contributed to the development of increasingly refined and realistic theories of fertility change. Policymakers and program managers in the developing world have been concerned about the contribution of high fertility to rapid population growth and poor reproductive health, and they have focused on implementing effective programs—in practice, mostly family planning programs—to reduce high and unwanted fertility. Until recently, less attention had been given to determinants and consequences of fertility in post-transitional societies. Conventional theories have little to say about the level at which fertility will stabilize at the end of the transition, although it is often assumed or implied that replacement fertility of about 2.1 births per woman will prevail in the long run (Demeny 1997; Caldwell 1982). This assumption is, for example, incorporated in the population projections of the UN and World Bank (medium variants). As a result, these projections expect population size to stabilize in the long run. If fertility in contemporary post-transitional societies had indeed leveled off at or near the replacement level, there would have been limited interest in the subject because this would have been expected and concern about potential adverse consequences would have been limited. However, fertility has dropped below the replacement level—sometimes by a substantial margin—in virtually every population that has moved through the demographic transition. If future fertility remains at these low levels, populations will decline in size and will age rapidly. These demographic developments in turn are likely to have significant societal consequences (Coale 1986). Concern about these effects has led to a recent surge in scientific, programmatic, and popular interest in this topic. This paper examines the relationship between reproductive preferences and observed fertility. Conventional fertility theories have focused on explaining how 4 social and economic development and changing ideas and values determine the desired number of children (see van de Kaa 1998 for a discussion of the determinants of post-transitional preferences). These theories often assume implicitly or explicitly that couples are able to implement their preferences without much difficulty and that observed fertility is not very different from average desired family size. A declining desired family size is indeed one of the principal forces driving fertility transitions, but in reality levels of fertility often deviate substantially from stated preferences. An example of such a deviation is found in most contemporary developed countries, where desired family size is typically two children while fertility is well below replacement. This divergence between actual fertility and desired family size is a new and unexamined phenomenon. It is of much more than theoretical interest because it raises the possibility that the low fertility observed in contemporary post-transitional societies is depressed because of temporary factors. If that is the case, fertility may be expected to rise to a level closer to the preferred level in the future, and concern over the undesirable demographic implications of prolonged very low fertility in post-transitional societies may be misplaced or premature. The causes of this discrepancy between actual and preferred fertility and its implications for future fertility trends will be examined below. After a brief overview of levels and trends in fertility and reproductive preferences at the end of the transition, the factors responsible for elevating or reducing fertility relative to desired family size will be discussed. The paper concludes with an assessment of future prospects. TRENDS IN LATE-TRANSITIONAL FERTILITY Fertility in the developed world reached its post–World War II maximum at 2.8 births per woman during the peak of the baby boom in the late 1950s. Steep