Supplement to “ the Farsighted Stable Set ”

Supplement to Stable Farsighted Coalitions in Competitive Markets - Technical Appendix

A Farsighted Stable Set for Partition Function Games

In this paper, we introduce a concept of a farsighted stable set for a partition function game and interpret the union of all farsighted stable sets as the core of the game, to be called the strongcore, which reduces to the traditional core if the worth of every coalition is independent of the partition to which it belongs and the game is adequately represented by a characteristic function. We ...

Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest consistent set. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set. Moreover, the proof of this result points out that each TU-game has a farsighted stable set. We go further by providing a characterization of the...

Farsightedly stable networks

We propose a new concept, pairwise farsighted stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise farsighted stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equal off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading ...

Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

The stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern imposes credibility on coalitional deviations. Their credibility notion can be extended to cover farsighted coalitional deviations, as proposed by Harsanyi (1974), and more recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). However, the resulting farsighted stable set suffers from a conceptual drawback: while coalitional deviations improve on existing o...

Rational expectations and farsighted stability

In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be domi...