The Structure of Signaling: A Combinatorial Optimization Model with Network-Dependent Estimation

Who talks with whom in national policymaking? How do lobbyists allocate their social resources to best receive information? And how does network position condition which lobbyists get access? We analyze communication networks among lobbyists and government actors in national politics. We begin by wedding rational choice models to network analysis with a formal analysis of lobbyists’ choice of contacts in a network, adopting the classic combinatorial optimization approach of Boorman (1975). The model predicts that when the demand for political information is low, a cocktail equilibrium prevails: lobbyists will invest their time in gaining “weak tie” acquaintances rather than in gaining “strong tie” trusted partners. When the demand for information in a policy domain is high, then both cocktail equilibria and “chum” equilibria (all strong-tie networks) prevail. We then turn to an empirical analysis of lobbying networks and access, using the data of Laumann and Knoke in The Organizational State. We analyze the communication structure of the policy domains in health policy, using count data models that are adjusted for “structural autocorrelation” by the networks we study. The results support the cocktail equilibrium hypothesis, and offer a result that portends rich questions for future research: Washington lobbyists appear to overinvest in strong ties, reducing the informational efficiency of lobbying networks. Note: An earlier and different version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 10-13, 1997. We thank John Brehm and Paul Teske for helpful comments on this earlier version.