Price - Based Optimal Resource Allocation in Multi - Hop Wireless Networks

Recent advances in wireless communications and digital electronics have enabled rapid development of a variety of wireless network technologies. The undeniable popularity of wireless network is due to its ubiquity and convenience, which is appreciated by the users. In this dissertation, we study the problem of resource allocation in multihop wireless networks (so called ad hoc networks). A wireless ad hoc network consists of a collection of wireless nodes without a fixed infrastructure. Two wireless nodes communicate with each other directly, if they are within the transmission range of each other. Otherwise, the communication is achieved through the relays of intermediate nodes. Compared with traditional wireline networks, the unique characteristics of wireless networks pose fundamental challenges to the design of effective resource allocation algorithms that are optimal with respect to resource utilization and fair across different network flows. Particularly, the following issues of wireless networks need fresh treatment: (1) Interference of wireless communication. Flows not only contend at the same node (contention in the time domain), but also compete for shared channel if they are within the interference ranges of each other (contention in the spatial domain). (2) Multiple resource usage. Sending data from one wireless node to another needs to consume multiple resources, most notably wireless bandwidth and battery energy. (3) Autonomous communication entities. The wireless nodes usually belong to different autonomous entities. They may lack the incentive to contribute to the network functionality in a cooperative way. (4) Rate diversity. Wireless nodes can adaptively change the transmission bit rate based on perceived channel conditions. This leads to a wireless network with rate diversity, where competing flows within the interference range transmit at different rates. None of the existing resource allocation algorithms in wireless ad hoc networks have realisiii tically considered end-to-end flows spanning multiple hops. Moreover, strategies proposed for wireline networks are not applicable in the context of wireless ad hoc network, due to its unique characteristics. In this dissertation, we propose a new price-based resource allocation framework in wireless ad hoc networks to achieve optimal resource utilization and fairness among competing end-toend flows. We build our pricing framework on the notion of maximal cliques in wireless ad hoc networks, as compared to individual links in traditional wide-area wireline networks. Based on such a price-based theoretical framework, we present a two-tier iterative algorithm. Distributed across wireless nodes, the algorithm converges to a global network optimum with respect to resource allocations. Further, we present a price pair mechanism to coordinate multiple resource allocations, and to provide incentives simultaneously such that cooperation is promoted and the desired global optimal network operating point is reached by convergence with a fully decentralized self-optimizing algorithm. Such desired network-wide global optimum is characterized with the concept of Nash bargaining solution, which not only provides the Pareto optimal point for the network, but is also consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory. Finally, we present a channel aware price generation scheme to decompose the bit rate adjustment and the flow rate allocation. The allocation result achieves channel time fairness where user fairness and channel utilization is balanced. The major achievements of this dissertation are outlined as follows. 1. It models a system-wide optimal operation point of a wireless network, and outlines the solution space of resource allocation in a multihop wireless network; 2. It presents a price-based distributed resource allocation algorithm to achieve this global optimal point; 3. It presents a low overhead implementation of the price-based resource allocation algorithm; 4. It presents an incentive mechanism that enables the resource allocation algorithm when users are selfish. iv TO MY PARENTS AND YI