Equilibrium Information Disclosure and Unraveling
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same amount of information is disclosed in all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the equilibrium amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur. ∗We are grateful to Drew Fudenberg, Kate Ho, Ed Lazear, Muriel Niederle, Al Roth, Andrei Shleifer, Larry Summers, Adam Szeidl, and seminar participants at Brandeis University, Harvard University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and the NBER Labor Studies Meeting for comments and suggestions.
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