Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage

Developmental ideas and models concerning family life have been disseminated widely around the world where they have become forces for both ideational and behavioral change. In this paper, we examine the ways in which ideas about marriage have been influenced by these ideas of development in Nepal, where, for centuries, young age at marriage, arranged marriage, and polygamy have been common practice, and intercaste marriage and divorce have been virtually non-existent. Using recently collected data from face-to-face surveys and semi-structured interviews, we demonstrate that large fractions of Nepalis now endorse marriage behaviors more similar to those frequently heralded as “modern” or “developed” family behaviors. Our results suggest that preferred age at marriage has risen, tolerance for intercaste marriage, divorce, and the involvement of young people in the choice of their spouse has increased, and polygamy has become increasingly taboo. Cohort replacement, increasing education, media exposure, and urbanization help explain these changes. However, although there has been dramatic change in the attitudes Nepalis have about marriage practices, we do not find complete acceptance of so-called modern family attitudes. Developmental ideas and models of family life have been creatively and selectively integrated into the continuously evolving models of family life in Nepal. Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 2 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS This paper is motivated by the premise that developmental ideas and models, specifically those concerning family life, have been disseminated widely around the world where they have become forces for ideational and behavioral change (Thornton 2001, 2005). Models of development, modernity, and progress have provided a central interpretive framework, used by Western social scientists for the past several hundred years, for categorizing populations and societies, for interpreting cross-cultural heterogeneity, and for labeling and explaining social change. In addition, world leaders and policy makers have for centuries utilized the developmental framework to promote the need for progress, modernity, and development for the collective human good. Having become so pervasive, the idea of development is described as a central element of world culture (Meyer et al. 1997). We believe that these notions of progress, modernity, and development originated in Western countries and have spread to non-Western societies around the world, having a substantial influence on societal infrastructures and social attitudes. In many ways this developmental framework has provided what Clifford Geertz (1973; also see Fricke 1997a, 1997b, and D’Andrade 1984) has described as an ideational model of and for reality. As models of reality, ideational frameworks provide classification systems for describing the world, models for interpreting both variation and change in human behavior and relationships, and definitions of the significance of various elements of social, economic, and familial life for the human condition. In this way they define the relevant actors in a system and the significance of specific behaviors and institutions for defining and shaping social structures and relationships. As models for reality, ideational systems provide frameworks for dealing with and reacting to the world, defining for actors a framework for identifying what is important and good in life and what appropriate methods are available for achieving desired goals. In this way, these models specify a framework detailing what is acceptable and moral, and they help to establish motivations for actors within a common context— prescribing both appropriate end goals and mechanisms for reaching those ends. As we specify below, developmental ideas have provided both models of and models for reality that have been disseminated widely around the world, have come into conflict with many indigenous ideational systems, and have been forces for extensive social change, particularly in the ways people marry and conduct their family lives. As an ideational model of reality, we introduce the developmental paradigm, a model of social change that has dominated much of Western thinking from the Enlightenment of the 1600s and 1700s to the present. This paradigm suggests that all societies progress through the same natural, universal, and necessary stages of development (for detailed discussions, see Burrow 1981; Harris 1968; Stocking 1968, 1987; Nisbet 1969; Smith 1973; Sanderson 1990; Mandelbaum 1971; Thornton 2001, 2005). Scholars using this paradigm believed that the most advanced or modern societies were in northwest Europe and among the northwest European Diaspora, while other societies occupied less advanced positions of development. This notion was posited alongside the idea that those societies in less advanced positions had the potential to continue development along the same trajectory that more developed societies had journeyed. Through a comparative method we define as reading history sideways, these scholars believed that they could use this cross-sectional variation to infer the nature of developmental trajectories across time, assuming that at some time in the past the most developed nations had been like their less developed contemporaries and that at some point in the future the least developed nations would become like their more modern neighbors (for detailed discussions, see Berkhofer 1978; Carniero 1973; Gordon 1994; Harris 1968; Manuel 1962; Sanderson 1990; Sheehan 1980; Thornton 2001, 2005). Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 3 Scholars observed many dimensions associated with populations perceived to be at the peak of their development paths. Among these elements were industrialism, urban living, high levels of education and knowledge, high consumption, geographic mobility, secularism, democracy, and religious pluralism. Scholars believed that there had been actual increases in many of these dimensions of northwest European social and economic life, whereas these changes had not yet occurred in areas outside northwest Europe. These scholars also observed many family characteristics associated with the societies that they labeled as developed or modern. Compared to northwest Europe, other societies could generally be characterized as family-organized, as having considerable family solidarity, and as extended. Marriage was frequently universal, arranged by parents, and contracted at a young age. Armed with the developmental paradigm and the method of reading history sideways, generations of scholars concluded that the process of development transformed family systems from the “traditional” patterns observed outside of northwest Europe to the “developed” patterns within northwest Europe (Thornton 2001, 2005). These scholars created theories about the unique northwest European family system being causally connected to the northwest European social and economic system. Most saw this causation as being the influence of socioeconomic development on family change, but others hypothesized an effect of family change on socioeconomic development. These ideas and conclusions permeated the scholarly literature from the 1700s through the middle 1900s. As we noted earlier, ideational models do not just provide an understanding of the world, but a framework for dealing with and reacting to the world; in other words, a model for reality. The developmental paradigm and reading history sideways were not just ideas and approaches used by several generations of scholars to interpret the world; rather, this conceptual paradigm and methodology were combined with the conclusions that social scientists derived from them to form a strong model—that we label developmental idealism—to guide and motivate subsequent social change. Developmental idealism came to provide motivations and approaches for social change in numerous contexts, ranging from politics to economics to demography, specifying how improvements in the human condition should be sought. In the family arena that is of central importance to this paper, developmental idealism helped to define which elements of marriage and family life were good and moral, how family life was causally connected with economic advancement, and how people could achieve what the model specified as desirable. Although the propositions within the developmental idealism model extend to multiple arenas such as politics and economics, we note four that have been extremely powerful forces in changing family behavior around the world during the past two centuries: 1) modern society is good and attainable; 2) modern family is good and attainable; 3) modern society and modern family are causally connected; 4) freedom, equality, and consent are fundamental human rights in many domains, including the family. In this framework, modern society is defined as it has been by generations of scholars and policy makers as including the social and economic attributes of Western societies considered to be at the apex of development, including wealth, industrialism, urban living, and high levels of education and knowledge. Similarly, modern family is defined as encompassing the aspects of family identified by generations of earlier scholars as modern, including nuclear households, intergenerational independence and autonomy, monogamy, marriages arranged by mature couples, courtship preceding marriage, older and less universal marriage, a high valuation of women, and an emphasis on freedom and equality in family relationships. This framework of developmental idealism provides a set of ideas about modern society, modern family, and human rights and equality that are acknowledged as positive for societies, providing a model for achieving and living the good life. Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 4 Although the ideas of the developmental paradigm, reading history sideways, the conclusions of social scientists, and the propositions of developmental idealism originated primarily among the elite of the West, there have been many mechanisms for the dissemination of them throughout the world, both in the West and elsewhere. The ideas of the developmental paradigm and developmental idealism have been spread actively through the mass media, education, industrialization, and urbanization, as well as numerous social movements and organizations, such as Christian churches, European conquest and colonization, political democracy, Marxism and socialism, the foreign policy programs of the United States, the United Nations and other international government and nongovernmental organizations, women’s movements, and international family planning programs. A growing body of information suggests that these ideas have, in many places, percolated down to the grassroots levels where they are believed and understood by ordinary people (Ahearn 2001; Amin 1989; Blaut 1993; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; Dahl and Rabo 1992; Kahn 2001; Kulick 1992; Latham 2000; Lee 1994; LiPuma 2000; Nisbet 1980; Pigg 1992, 1996; Robertson 1992; Samoff 1999; Sanderson 1990; Thornton 2001, 2005; Wallerstein 1979, 1991). As argued elsewhere (Thornton 2001, 2005), the dissemination and acceptance of developmental models have had an important effect on family life, both in the West and elsewhere. The acceptance of the ideas of developmental idealism can be a powerful force for altering a broad array of family structures and relationships, including childbearing, parent-child relationships, marriage, living arrangements, and relationships between wives and husbands. For people in nonWestern populations, the spread and acceptance of developmental idealism often introduces models of family life that conflict with the indigenous models which have evolved through years of local experience and tradition. In contexts where the family-related tenets of developmental idealism become valorized, indigenous family systems in opposition to one or more of these tenets are decried as traditional, are associated with a low standard of living and poor health, and are advertised as preventing economic progress. These often competing forces of developmental idealism and indigenous family culture lead to unique constructions of models of and for family life, some more reflective of developmental idealism or local cultural tradition than others. In recent decades, many non-Western societies have experienced dramatic change in patterns of marriage parallel to the kinds of change developmental idealism encourages. Particularly striking have been changes from arranged marriages to love matches, from young to older ages at marriage, and from universal marriage to the potential for extensive non-marriage. Also important have been dramatic increases in the use of contraception, rapid declines in childbearing, and increases in nuclear households. These numerous family changes have many potential causes, including structural impetuses such as shifts in the economy that alter family organization, thereby changing the value of spouses and children; however, many times, dramatic family change occurs in the absence of structural change, suggesting that change in family models can probably be attributed, at least in part, to the spread and creative implementation of new ideas about family life (Thornton 2005; Watkins 1986). Although we believe that developmental idealism has had effects on many family relationships and behaviors in many parts of the world, the emphasis in this paper will be on one dimension of family life, marriage, in one part of the world, Nepal. Our goal is to provide new information and perspectives on changing marriage attitudes and behavior in Nepal, with particular emphasis on the extent to which those changes are interrelated with the spread of developmental idealism. Although our overall aspirations are for a definitive answer concerning the influence of developmental idealism on marriage attitudes and behavior, we recognize that such a goal is beyond the limits of current data and methods. Consequently, we embark on the more restrictive task of providing empirical evidence Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 5 that, while not definitive, provides extensive support for the importance of developmental idealism in changing marriage attitudes and behavior in Nepali society today. Our goals are facilitated by the fact that Nepal has historically been a society with a family system that generations of social scientists have characterized as “traditional.” As we discuss in detail in the next section, evidence consistently shows that the predominant marriage system in Nepal can be characterized as historically having the following attributes: young and universal marriage (even child marriage); arranged marriage; endogamous (intra-caste) marriage; polygamy; and restrictions on divorce and widow remarriage (Macfarlane 1976; Maskey 1996; Rijal 2003; Stone 1978; Vaidya et al. 1993). Furthermore, Nepal was isolated from the West until the 1950s, so these historical aspects of Nepali family systems have existed well into the twentieth century. This makes Nepal an especially appropriate country in which to study the effects of relatively recent developmental models. After reviewing the historical Nepali marriage system, we discuss how it has changed dramatically in recent decades, with a primary emphasis on the rapid increases in age at marriage and the involvement of young people in the mate selection process (Ahearn 2001; Axinn and Barber 2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Fricke 1997b; Fricke et al. 1991, 1998; Ghimire et al. 2006; Morgan and Niraula1995; Niraula 1994; Niraula and Morgan 1996). We also discuss likely sources of dissemination of those developmental ideas that have an effect on family life in Nepal. We then present results from new survey data collected in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal during 2003 to demonstrate that Nepalis have embraced many dimensions of the second proposition of developmental idealism—that the modern family is good and attainable—as it relates to marriage. That is, we show that large proportions of Nepalis endorse what developmental idealism promotes as “modern” marriage patterns rather than behaviors more typical of historic Nepali patterns. However, the data also show that wholescale acceptance of all “modern” marriage behaviors has not occurred. Many Nepalis still endorse certain aspects of their indigenous marriage systems as favorable to the modern family model, highlighting the extent to which local actors take global models, such as developmental idealism, and creatively incorporate them into their models for family life. In addition to the patterns we show with our survey data, we include excerpts from a set of individual and group semi-structured interviews to demonstrate how people in Nepal describe their models for marriage and how and why these models have changed over time. Finally, we use the survey data to examine differentials in the endorsement of modern marriage patterns based on education, media exposure, birth cohort, and distance from an urban center. Where examples of the roles of these factors emerge from our individual and group semi-structured interviews, we again provide quotes from semi-structured interviews to illustrate how the people themselves describe these dynamics. CHANGING FAMILY LIFE IN NEPAL Nepal is home to a variety of religio-ethnic groups; however, given Hinduism’s long-term reign as the official state religion, Hindu marriage values and norms have provided, for centuries, very strict religious prescriptions for family life. According to Hinduism, marriage is obligatory and sacramental, more than just a simple bond between two individuals. Rather, marriage is a bond between families and a promise of continuity in patriarchal family lines. Therefore, marriage has a history of deep religious, social, and institutional significance (Banerjee 1984; Bennett 1983; Berreman 1972; Bista 1972; Mace and Mace 1960; Majupuria and Majupuria 1989; Pothen 1989; Stone 1978). Hindu doctrine prohibits youth participation in spouse selection and considers the virginity of a bride-to-be the most essential qualification for marriage, therefore encouraging early marriage arranged by parents Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 6 (Banerjee 1984; Bennett 1976; Berreman 1972; Bista 1972; Mace and Mace 1960; Macfarlane 1976; Matthews 1989; Pothen 1989). In addition, other aspects of Hinduism prohibit divorce, inter-caste marriage, and widow marriage, particularly by women, and condone polygyny (Banerjee 1984; Bennett 1983; Berreman 1972; Bista 1972; Mace and Mace 1960; Majupuria and Majupuria 1989; Pothen 1989; Stone 1978). The ultimate goals of Hindu marriage, according to the Vedas, are dharma (practice of religion), praja (procreation), and rati (sexual pleasure). Based on Hindu ideals, a man should have at least one son to execute his funeral and continue his family line. Consequently, contraception has been considered to be a sin, and childlessness has been condemned with severe negative cultural repercussions, particularly for women (Stone 1978). High fertility is heavily emphasized in religious blessings from the elders of the family to their young. For example, the often spoken blessing “Dhan Jana Briddhirastu (let there be an increase of wealth and family members)”, explicitly makes a large family an important goal in life. However, Hinduism is not the only religion in Nepal, and family patterns, customs, rituals, values, norms, and behaviors show variance based on religio-ethnic identity (Bista 1972; Macfarlane 1976; Majupuria and Majupuria 1989). Throughout history, many non-Hindus married at older ages than Hindus, did not stress premarital abstinence, practiced cross-cousin or polyandrous marriage, and allowed youth more say in the choice of a spouse (Goldstein 1975; Macfarlane 1976; Shrestha and Singh 1987; Smith 1973). Some groups also had no social sanctions on divorce, remarriage, or widow marriage (Bista 1972; Blaikie et al. 1980; Macfarlane 1976; Shrestha and Singh 1987). Many nonHindus generally had first births at older ages and extended families were less common when compared to most Hindus (Bista 1972; Macfarlane 1976). For these reasons, there is religio-ethnic variance in marriage practices in Nepal. On the other hand, in parts of Nepal, such as the Chitwan Valley where different religio-ethnic groups constantly interact, and High Caste Hindus—the highest caste in Nepal—have a history of power and privilege, many non-Hindu groups aspire to high caste status by imitating high-caste Hindu family patterns, customs, rituals, culture, and behaviors (Banerjee 1984; Berreman 1972; Dastider 1995; Hofer 1979; Guneratne 2001; Gurung 1988; Majupuria and Majupuria 1989; Maskey 1996; Sharma 1977). Although Hinduism, both as an ideology and a normative force, has had important influences on both the attitudes about family life and family behavior, Nepalese family patterns, customs, rituals, values, norms, and behaviors have changed rapidly in recent years within all castes. Individual choices in marriage behavior, especially with regards to inter-caste marriage, late marriage, and divorce, are occurring more commonly than ever before (Acharya 1998; Ahearn 2001; Dahal and Fricke 1998; Dahal et al. Lama 1996; Ghimire et al.2006; Gray 1991; NDHS 2002; Niraula 1994; Niraula and Lawoti 1998; Niraula and Morgan 1996; Rijal 2003; Suwal 2001). For example, in Nepal, where child marriage was quite common until the early 1950s, the proportion of women never married by ages 15 – 19 increased from 25.7 in 1961 to 59.7 in 2001, a 136 percent increase (NDHS 2002). Similarly, the average age at first marriage in Chitwan has increased from 13.5 years for those who married between 1950 and 1959 to 19 years for those who married between 1980 and 1989 (Ghimire 2003; Yabiku 2005). The proportion of individuals who participated in the choice of their spouse rose from virtually zero at the turn of the century to approximately 50 percent in the 1986-95 marriage cohort (Ghimire et al. 2006). Also, age at first birth and contraceptive use is increasing and family size is shrinking (Acharya 1998; Aryal 1991; Axinn and Barber 2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001, Ghimire 2003; NDHS 2002; Satayavada and Adamchak 2000; Shreshta 1998; Subedi 1998; Suwal 2001; Thapa 1997; Tuladhar 1987). Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 7 There are, of course, a multitude of social and economic changes occurring in Nepal that could influence these changes in family behavior, making it difficult to identify with any precision the influence of new ideas. Yet, all of this dramatic family change has occurred in the direction that developmental idealism encourages. Further, these changes are not only occurring in urban areas, but in rural areas where educational attainment is not high and economic change is slow. Taken altogether, we suggest this is consistent with the idea that the spread of developmental idealism is playing an important role in changing marital behaviors and attitudes in Nepal. In the next section, we address the different mechanisms for the spread of developmental idealism in Nepal—mechanisms which we suggest play an important role in changing attitudes and behavior. THE DISSEMINATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL IDEALISM There have been many mechanisms for the spread of developmental idealism in Nepal, with the Nepalese government being one of the largest factors. In the 1950s, the government began a planned development process, with the primary goal being the modernization of Nepal. The government proceeded to publish a new set of goals every five years, with the most recent set of goals announced in 2002 (Hoftun et al. 1999; MOPE 2002; NPC 1992, 1998, 2002). Accelerating the rate of socioeconomic development and lowering the rate of population growth have been the main goals in each successive development plan of Nepal since the beginning of the planned development process. A continuous flow of foreign aid both in terms of grants and advisors from western countries has contributed to the process (Bista 1991; Pandey 1999). Nepal’s Eighth Development Plan (1992-1997) emphasizes the reduction of population growth, protection and conservation of environmental resources, and acceleration of economic growth as primary goals. Specific population targets included: 1) reduction of the total fertility rate; 2) increase of the contraceptive prevalence rate in married women of reproductive age; 3) raising of the life expectancy; 4) decreasing the infant mortality rate; and 5) reduction of the maternal mortality rate (Joshi 1995). In addition to these key health indicators, the following socio-economic development policy exemplifies the importance that the Nepali government has placed on changing family behaviors: Information, education and communication programmes will be launched on a national scale which will help to promote female education, raise age at marriage, increase the value of the girl child and thus ultimately help to create the atmosphere of having two children per family (Joshi 1995, p. 498). Since the development planning process was first introduced in 1952, Nepal has seen tremendous growth in mass education, science based allopathic health services, mass transportation, and mass communication. For example, although a formal public education system modeled after that in the West had not existed in Nepal before the 1950s (Sharma 1972), since 1954 there has been a rapid increase in the number of schools, the literacy rate, and the proportion of people attending school (Central Bureau of Statistics 2001). There have also been dramatic increases in the number of people employed outside the home (both locally and abroad), the number of Nepalis traveling within and outside Nepal, and the exposure to local and global media (Beutel and Axinn 2002; Central Bureau of Statistics 1995, 2002; Sharma 1994). There has also been a rapid increase in the number of diplomats and tourists visiting Nepal, with foreign travelers visiting most parts of the country—from Kathmandu to the remotest areas. Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 8 Evidence from prior research is consistent with the idea that developmental idealism has spread through the mechanisms described above, and that it is influencing Nepalis’ models of and for reality on issues of family life and more. Using other measures from the same survey we use for our analyses in this paper, Thornton et al. (2004, 2005) show that developmental thinking has been disseminated widely in Nepal. Their findings indicate that the majority of Nepalis have considerable knowledge of the ideas of development, substantial knowledge about the major countries of the world, can rate countries on their levels of education and development, and believe that there is an association between socioeconomic development and family structure (Thornton et al. 2004, 2005). Ahearn (2001) in her work in Western Nepal found important influences of schooling on youth, both as a source of new ideas and a means of communication. She argues that exposure to western schooling was an important source of ideas about “love marriage”—ideas uncommon in these youths’ parent’s generation, and that continued exposure to western-style education is considered to be the path to success: Love letter writers believe that love enables them to achieve “life success,” which they define as carving out lives for themselves that mirror the images they see and hear about in a diverse array of media, from textbooks and magazines to Hindi and Nepali films to Radio Nepal development programs. These images promote a lifestyle based on formal education, knowledge of English, lucrative employment, the consumption of commodities, and a sense of self founded on individualism (Ahearn 2001, p. 151). Pigg (1992, 1996) eloquently describes how the spread of science-based allopathic health services in remote villages has introduced the idea of modernity and influenced the belief systems. She shows that even those Nepalis in remote parts of the country are familiar with the ideas of modernity and use them extensively in their understanding of both the larger world and their own lives. Guneratne (2001) argues that interactions between tourists and local residents of Chitwan have transformed the historical ethnic supremacy of Brahmins over Tharus into a new educational scale with “educated” and “non-educated” at opposing points, thus providing new ways to look at ethnic relations and the social world. He argues that Tharus strongly believe in the model of Backwardness – Forwardness, attributing their own “backwardness” to their history of having less formal education than other groups. Two studies in particular have linked sources of the spread of developmental idealism, such as mass education, mass media, development programs, and wage labor opportunities outside the home, to changes in marital behavior including later marriage and more involvement of youth in the selection of marital partners. Niraula (1994), in his study of marriage change in the central hills of Nepal, has documented dramatic change in both the timing of marriage and marriage practices in Nepal, and how these relate to the mechanisms we argue spread developmental idealism. He found a positive association between older age at marriage and the spread of education, the commercialization of rural economy, the spread of mass media, and other development programs. He argues that the changes in marriage timing and marriage practices are brought by attitudinal changes that are a result of socioeconomic forces. In the same line, Ghimire et al. (2006), in their study of premarital experiences with non-family activities and participation in spouse selection, have found important influences of schooling, non-family employment, media exposure and participation in youth clubs. Indeed, exposure to media has a much stronger effect than many of the other socioeconomic changes such as schooling and employment, suggesting an important role for the ideational dimension of change. While these two studies focus on marital behavior outcomes, our work focuses on attitudes to explicitly look for evidence that developmental idealism is influencing models of marriage. Developmental Idealism and Changing Models of Marriage 9 STUDY SITE AND METHODS FOR NEW 2003 DATA In order to understand how people currently feel about marriage in Nepal, we collected both qualitative and quantitative data. We now turn to our discussion first to the data collection itself, and then to the findings in these data. Setting in Chitwan, Nepal We begin by noting that our data come from Nepal, currently ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world. Over 85 percent of the population still lives in rural areas, and more than half of the population is still illiterate. Our research was conducted in one region of Nepal, the Chitwan Valley, which lies in the south central part of Nepal. Before the 1950s, Chitwan was covered with dense tropical forest and world famous flora and fauna with only a few non-Hindu people such as Chepang Tharus, Majhis, and Botes, who earned their livelihood through hunting, fishing, and gathering forest products in Chitwan. In 1955, the Nepalese government opened this valley for settlement. The government distributed land parcels to people coming from adjoining districts of the country. In 1956, the government, in collaboration with the United States government, implemented a malaria eradication program, and Chitwan soon became a “melting pot,” receiving migrants from all over the country. Although, up until the 1970s, the Chitwan Valley was very isolated from the rest of the country, since the late 1970s, the valley has undergone rapid changes in terms of both physical and socioeconomic conditions (Shivakoti et al. 1997). The valley has become connected to the rest of the country by all-weather roads making it one of the business hubs of the country. Most people who travel to the capital city, Kathmandu, from India pass through this valley. Furthermore, there has been a massive expansion of schools, health services, markets, bus services, cooperatives, and employment centers in Chitwan (Axinn and Yabiku 2001). This transformation, from an isolated valley to a busy business center and fast-growing valley, has had a tremendous impact on the daily social life of communities and individuals. At the individual level, the massive expansion of services such as schools, health services, bus services, market, employment centers, cinema halls and communication facilities, resulted in more young people going to school, working outside the family, and interacting with mass media. Previous work in Chitwan shows that there has been a sharp increase in school enrollment, visits to health clinics, employment outside of the home, and exposure to different sources of mass media in recent birth cohorts (Axinn and Barber 2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Ghimire et al. 2006).