Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers’ Bids Determine Royalty Rates

نویسندگان

  • Cuihong Fan
  • Byoung Heon Jun
  • Elmar Wolfstetter
  • Elmar G. Wolfstetter
چکیده

Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. — Department of Economics — University of Bonn — D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 — Fax: +49(0228)739221 * Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics Email: [email protected] ** Sung-Buk Ku An-am Dong 5-1, Seoul 136-701, Korea, Email: [email protected] *** Corresponding Author: Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Email: [email protected]

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تاریخ انتشار 2010