On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is shown by example that learning rules of the fictitious play type fail to converge in certain kinds of coordination games. Variants of fictitious play in which past actions are eventually forgotten and that incorporate small stochastic perturbations are better behaved for this class of games: over the long run, players coordinate with probability one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. Q 1998 Academic Press
منابع مشابه
Fictitious play in coordination games
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as...
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