Jaspers' View of Body, Psyche, and Mind in General Psychopathology, and Popper's Three Worlds

In general, metaphysical views are characterized as either monist or dualist. Interestingly, both Karl Jaspers and Karl Popper seem to have entertained what one might call "pluralist" views of reality. In the case of Jaspers, I will address his early views in General Psychopathology and in the case of Popper his later views as reflected in Objective Knowledge. Both thinkers discuss three separate aspects of reality. For Jaspers it is body, psyche, and mind. For Popper it is World 1 (physical world), World 2 (psychological world) and World 3 (world of culture). In both cases, two of the three aspects or entities are objective and one is subjective. Neither thinker takes a firm stand on the origin of such entities or aspects of reality. Popper tacitly assumed that they all emerge from the physical world without really asserting it to be the case. Surely, he believed that culture emerged from psychological reality. Jaspers is even more reticent to discuss origins in his early work but given his interests and influences he seems even further from materialism. The most significant similarity between the two thinkers seems to be the absolute irreducibility of the three realms, at least in terms of our normal cognitive capacities. Hence both pose serious challenges to monistic ways of thinking, whether physicalist or idealist. In this essay I describe and analyze Jaspers' early view of body, psyche, and mind and compare it with the Three Worlds model of Karl Popper, a product of his later years. What is interesting about both of their theoretical or ontological views is the positing of not one (monism) or two (dualism) but three fundamental categories of being. There are important differences, however. We know that Popper was aware of Jaspers' work and he was the only "existentialist" that he had any respect for at all. I do not know, however, whether Popper was acquainted with the General Psychopathology. The fact that Popper's original academic credentials were in psychology and that his native language was German makes it likely, however, that he was aware either of Jaspers' psychological views or similar views that circulated in the German-speaking world. Although Popper and Jaspers were very different kinds of thinkers, certain parallels can be noted. Both were intensely interested in science as well as philosophy and both originally were drawn to sciences of the human mind. Both distrusted scientific theories to an extent and were insistent regarding their fallibility and tentativeness. Both were extremely suspicious of utopian political programs and hyper-allergic to totalitarianisms of all kinds. Popper situated himself in the empiricist camp even as he distanced himself from both logical positivism and linguistic analysis. Jaspers was firmly situated in Continental philosophy and with concepts that were anathema and/or incomprehensible to Anglo-American philosophizing. Nevertheless, both found themselves, to a certain extent, misunderstood outcastes in their respective camps and this was the Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts http://www.bu.edu/paideia/existenz Volume 3, No 2, Fall 2008 50 case because they refused to limit themselves to prescribed worldviews. This is nowhere clearer than in Jaspers' early psychiatric work and Poppers' later theorizing, capped by his collaboration with Sir John Eccles, a neurophysiologist with decidedly religious views. Popper, however, was completely "unmusical" (in Max Weber's words) regarding religion, much more so than Jaspers (who had a deep appreciation for religious phenomena). What is most strikingly similar about their views is the insistence on three realities that impact heavily upon the human person. For Jaspers it is body, psyche, and mind. For Popper it is matter (World 1), the psyche (World 2), and culture (World 3). Hence, the real difference seems to lie in Jaspers' mind vs. Popper's culture and the difference in orientation of the two thinkers may become apparent there. This will be discussed in greater detail anon. I will also argue that Popper's view has the promise of appealing to some on the fringes of empiricism who have as yet no appreciation for Continental philosophy. Jaspers' view, on the other hand, appeals to those with such an appreciation but who also utilize and are loyal to empirical methods in psychology and psychiatry. I will restrict this essay to General Psychopathology and will not discuss Jaspers' later purely philosophical work. That should not be interpreted as a belief that he changed his position later on but only as a restriction of the scope of this essay. Indeed, it is my tentative opinion that the views presented here can be understood even more clearly with reference to Philosophie and other later works. A Very Brief History of the Problem of Mind-Body Interaction This problem has plagued philosophy from the very beginning. Plato considered the human soul to be somehow akin to and potentially cognizant of the eternal Forms (Phaedo 100). At the same time it is imprisoned in the body. Not only is it imprisoned, but it is also affected (even in future incarnations) and deluded by physical processes (Timaeus 44b). Aristotle, however, considered the human soul to be intimately related to its particular body as the very form and purpose of an animate and intelligent being. On the surface this seems to limit the soul to a particular, finite existence in this world. Although in his epistemology, Aristotle at times spoke of the acquiring of forms through perception and cognition. This is done in a superlative way through the "common sense," which informs us of the evidence of the particular senses. Any sense, even those we share with the other animals, "has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms without the matter" (De Anima 424a). He also spoke vaguely about an active intellect that is somewhat distinct (though not necessarily separate) from the human soul, as we know it. For example, he states: "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed" (De Anima 408b). Augustine viewed the soul in a basically Platonic fashion but insisted upon a potentially direct relationship between the human soul and God, even if that potential was interrupted by original sin. Hence, the problem became reestablishment of the soul's knowledge of God rather than knowledge of a realm of impersonal, eternal Forms. Forgetfulness and recollection were replaced by repentance, yet the soul still remains a mystery to itself. Augustine was also a pioneer in stressing the interiority of human knowledge and consciousness. He employed the term "interior sensus" in a manner roughly equivalent to Aristotle's "common sense" but in a far more interior fashion.1 Throughout most of the Middle Ages, the Platonic and Aristotelian views were harmonized by various Neoplatonized Aristotelian doctrines, often containing Augustinian motifs as well. The most innovative views were those of the Arabic philosophers such as Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, who were influenced by Themistius and attempted to understand Plato and Aristotle from the perspective of the individual soul, something that the classical Greeks had ignored to a great extent.2 The major innovation of the Arabic thinkers was the conversion of the inert Platonic forms into living celestial souls or intellects. This gave them active, living intellectual qualities, like the ones we ordinarily associate with the human psyche. While this may seem an unnecessary proliferation of minds in the universe, it obviates the problem of mind-body interaction to a certain extent. That problem becomes acute when the soul is viewed as sui generis, as exemplified in Cartesian dualism. The Arabic philosophers, on the other hand, assume that the human psyche has access to both highly powerful minds as well as its own 1 See the Confessions, I, 20, VII, 17 and De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3-5. 2 Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) pp. 34-35. Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts http://www.bu.edu/paideia/existenz Volume 3, No 2, Fall 2008 51 body, since it remains intimately related to that body in an Aristotelian manner. The problem of psyche-body interaction is eliminated in favor of a more general problem of the relationship between cosmic intelligences and earthly or sub-lunar reality. This transformation of the human intellectual environment from abstract, inert forms to living intelligences set the stage for both Spinoza's one eternal mental/physical substance and ultimately the Hegelian Geist. Unfortunately, some knowledge or even sympathy with Hegelian philosophy is necessary in order to understand the intellectual world in which Jaspers lived. I say "unfortunately," because many American and other English-speaking thinkers either know little of that trend in philosophy or are so allergic to it that they wish not to know. This will become more significant when we come to look at the views of Popper. Worthy of mentioning also are some of the Renaissance thinkers that impressed Jaspers greatly: namely Nicholas of Cusa and Leonardo da Vinci. Cusanus might be considered a late medieval German thinker but he was quite influential on the Italian Renaissance. Leonardo was influenced by Cusanus who, in turn, was influenced by Themistius. These thinkers emphasized on the individual qualities and powers of the human soul, and this was a great influence on Jaspers. As we look at the human person endowed with mind and freedom we see the traces of an irreplaceable selfhood or at least of a unique individual. At some decisive point every individual is as it were, in theological language "created" from a source of his own and not merely a processing of a modified hereditary substance...Man as an individual mirrors the whole—at least so German philosophy since Nikolaus of Cusa has taught—and in him the world is presented in miniature; there is no substitute for him, he is unique. Far from being the sum of his hereditary factors (which would be quite correct for his material preconditions and determinants) the individual is "directly created of God."3 I would like to end this very brief excursus with a mention of Descartes and the British empiricists, best exemplified by Hume. Both of those thinkers are often thought of as skeptics and both seemed opposed to the medieval proliferation of substances and intelligences that I briefly described. Both have become heroes of sorts 3 Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 753. [Henceforth cited as GP] to modern philosophy, though Descartes is severely vilified for his mind-body dualism. The key point I want to make is that both Descartes and Hume left human intelligence alone in the universe, with the possible exception of a rather remote deity. Their views were more influential on Popper than they were on Jaspers. Two Contemporary Influences on Jaspers A very formidable influence on Jaspers was Max Weber, the sociologist. Weber, however, would have called himself an economist and Jaspers thought of him as a philosopher. Weber's concept of social science would come to play a large role in Jaspers' concept of psychiatry and psychology. For Weber, empirical research and causal connections were important but equally important was the understanding of unique events. The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). Our aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise.4 The interest in "relationships and the cultural significance of individual events" is very different from the kind of science that is only interested in statistical data regarding large numbers of cases. It will turn out to require understanding of cultural traditions and ideals. Jaspers was also greatly influenced by the phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl, whose methods would be used in the investigation of individual cases. This allows for empathy regarding the human psyche. But such empathy also inevitably involves appreciation of cultural content. As Jaspers insists, there is "no psychological understanding without empathy into content (symbol, forms, images, ideas) and without seeing the expression and sharing the experienced phenomena" (GP 302).