Bargaining and Repeated Games
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Transfer of Bargaining Power Sources in Oil Trade Games
Bargaining Power is one of the important issues in oil trade negotiations. In this paper two effective factors in bargaining power i.e. patient time to deal and outside options of each player have been considered. The necessary relations for exchange of sources in negotiation have been derived.
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