Online Appendix for “Hail to the Pork?: The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections” List of Tables

1 The electoral consequences of the change in federal grant spending per capita. These six models replicate the results from Tables 1-4 in the manuscript using the change in per capita grant spending in a county as the independent variable of interest, instead of the percentage change in grant spending in the county. The results are substantively identical to those presented in the manuscript. Increased per capita grant spending in a county boosts the incumbent party’s prospects in the next presidential election, particularly in counties from competitive states and in counties that are represented in Congress by members of the president’s party. Also consistent with theory, the relationship is significantly stronger in liberal and moderate counties than in conservative counties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 The electoral consequences of percent change in grant spending, excluding state capital counties. Block grants which are given to the state governments and then distributed to other parts of the state are assigned to the state capital county. To insure that this is not skewing our results, these models replicate the results from Tables 1-4 excluding state capital counties. All results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 Influence of the percent change in grant spending on the incumbent administration party’s vote share. Instead of analyzing the effect of grant spending on the change in the incumbent administration party’s vote share, these models replicate the results for Tables 1-4 by using the party’s actual vote share as the dependent variable and by including it’s vote share in the preceding election as an independent variable. The results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript across specifications. 5 4 The electoral consequences of percent change in grant spending, without county fixed effects. These models employ identical specifications to those used to produce Tables 1-4, except that they do not include county fixed effects. All of the results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 The electoral consequences of percent change in grant spending, with state fixed effects. These models employ identical specifications to those used to produce Tables 1-4, except that they employ state fixed effects instead of county fixed effects. All of the results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. . . . . . . . . 7 6 How partisan accountability mediates the influence of federal grant spending. This model replicates Table 3, but includes data only from those counties that are located completely within a single congressional district. The results are virtually identical to those presented in the manuscript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8