Managing Service Expectations in Online Markets: A Signaling Theory of E-tailer Pricing and Empirical Tests ¬リニ

Expectations play a significant role in determining customer perceptions and satisfaction. Accordingly, retailers seek to manage customers’ service expectations. However, the tangible signals of service quality that are available to brick-and-mortar retailers (such as location, store appearance, and salespersons’ behavior) may not be available in online markets. Using a signaling model, we obtain conditions when Internet retailers (e-tailers) use price to manage their customers’ service expectations. In contrast to extant theory, we find that it is possible for either low or high service e-tailers to use price in signaling their service levels. Further, we develop an appropriate deductive test of our theory based on price-ending patterns as an artifact of the signaling process. Based on this test, we find compelling evidence that e-tailers indeed manage service expectations using price. Interestingly, we also find preliminary evidence that suggests customers implicitly associate price-ending patterns with a retailer’s expected service level. We discuss several other implications of our findings for researchers and managers. (Expectations, Internet marketing, Pricing, Price-ending, Signaling, Separating and Pooling Equilibrium, Retailing)