The Proportional Lottery Protocol is Strongly β-participatory and Vnm-Strategy-Proof
نویسنده
چکیده
A voting protocol is said to be strongly participatory if for any player i and any strategy profile either the outcome is i‘s preferred one or i has a strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, and VNMstrategy proof if at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies of each player is a VNM-stable set. It is shown that the proportional lottery (PL) modular voting protocol is both strongly participatory and VNMstrategy proof. Jel Classification: D70,D71 Stefano Vannucci, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IGTR
دوره 10 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008