Characterizing the Set of Stable Matches in Many-to-One Matching Markets with Contracts
نویسنده
چکیده
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable matches is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, removing agents from the economy may decrease the payoffs to existing agents on both sides of the market. I introduce a new necessary condition to guarantee existence of a stable match and a separate new sufficient condition. These conditions show that new restrictions on individual preferences can be generated by explicitly defining them relative fixed market preferences. JEL classification: C62, C78, D44
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