Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market

This paper examines the implications of minimum standards for insurance markets. I study the imposition of binding minimum standards on the market for voluntary private health insurance for the elderly. The central estimates suggest that the introduction of the standards was associated with an 8 percentage point (25%) decrease in the proportion of the population with coverage in the affected market, with no evidence of substitution toward other, unregulated sources of insurance coverage. To explore possible factors contributing to the impact of the minimum standards, I develop comparative static predictions of the impact of imposing minimum standards in an insurance market with adverse selection. The observed changes in market equilibrium associated with the minimum standards are broadly consistent with these predictions, providing evidence of the existence of adverse selection in this insurance market. More importantly, they suggest that the presence of adverse selection—which in principle may provide an economic rationale for minimum standards— in practice may have exacerbated the declines in insurance coverage associated with the minimum standards. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: I18; I11; H51