Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey

This study examines India and Turkey as case studies relevant to the Senlis Council’s ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal. The proposal is that Afghan farmers are licensed to produce opium for medical and scientific purposes. Here it is posited that the Senlis proposal neglects at least three key lessons from the Turkish and Indian experiences. First, not enough weight has been given to diversion from licit markets, as experienced in India. Second, both India and Turkey had significantly more efficient state institutions with authority over the licensed growing areas. Third, the proposal appears to overlook the fact that Turkey’s successful transition was largely due to the use of the poppy straw method of opium production. It is concluded that, while innovative and creative policy proposals such as that of the Senlis proposal are required if Afghanistan is to move beyond its present problems, ‘poppies for medicine’ does not withstand evidence-based scrutiny. Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 2 The 1961 United Nations (UN) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (United Nations, 1961) restricts the use and production of opium to medical and scientific purposes. All other efforts to produce opium are illicit. The Single Convention additionally provides a monitoring framework which ensures that the legal production of opium remains highly regulated. State narcotics boards must not only take stringent measures to monitor and control opium production but are subject to monitoring by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and thereby accountable to the international community. In practice this means that a country cannot simply start producing opium for medical and scientific purposes, but must have the approval of the international community. It can only obtain that approval via INCB and the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the international bodies which promote the integrity of the legal drug trade and coordinate efforts to tackle the illegal trade. A national-level proposal that convinces the member states of CND and the appointed board members of the INCB must be watertight. Since 2005, the Senlis Council (now renamed the International Council on Security and Development) have lobbied governments and inter-governmental bodies to support its proposal for a ‘poppies for medicine’ industry in Afghanistan. 1 In brief, the proposal is that the government of Afghanistan should license some farmers to cultivate opium poppies from which the state produces medicinal morphine to sell to third-world nations at a lower price than in current markets (Bhattacharji and Kamminga, 2010; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007). It is currently proposing the implementation of a pilot project to analyze outcomes and inadvertent consequences (Kamminga, 2011). Creative and innovative proposals such as this are to be welcomed as the illicit opium trade has become one of the biggest risks to Afghanistan’s economic and political stability. However, the Senlis proposal for Afghanistan warrants scrutiny not least because of the potential ramifications for international opium and heroin markets, both licit and illicit, but also because of the potential implications for Afghanistan as a nation state. It is the need to ensure that any benefits of legal opium production must clearly outweigh any potential costs and risks in the context of a new and fragile democracy, which motivated the present study. 1 For the Senlis media campaign between 2008 and mid-2011 please search Paul Burton, Norine MacDonald and Jorrit Kamminga on Nexis-Lexis to access the numerous interviews with high-profile western media such as The Times, the Washington Times and The International Tribune Herald. Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 3 The ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal is supported by two case studies of the Indian and Turkish regimes. The basis of this paper is a critical analysis of these two pieces of research. By drawing upon a review of these regimes, it is suggested that the Senlis proposal neglects at least three key lessons from these experiences. First, not enough weight has been given to diversion from licit markets as experienced in India. Second, both India and Turkey had, and have, significantly more efficient state institutions with authority over the licensed growing areas. Third, the proposal appears to overlook the fact that Turkey’s successful transition was largely due to the use of the poppy straw method of opium production. The lessons from India and Turkey must be envisaged in the Afghan context. Here, the extremely-fragile nature of the Afghan nation-state and the lack of the rule of law are key factors. The authority of the Afghan state is weak in poppy-growing areas; corruption is endemic to most Afghan institutions including the administration of criminal justice which is also significantly under-resourced. Further, the country lacks the transport infrastructure required for a licit opium industry and there is the possibility that licensed opium production would affect only a small percentage of Afghans and generate resentment elsewhere. Consequently, based upon the analyses of experience in India and Turkey it is concluded that Afghanistan is not presently in a position to undertake a ‘poppies for medicine’ regime. To set the scene, the next section outlines the Senlis ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal and summarizes some critiques already expressed by policy analysts. This is followed by background information on, then analysis of, the Indian and Turkish licit opium industries and their use as case studies in support of the Senlis proposal. A review of some inefficiencies of the Afghan state which would act as a barrier to implementation of the plan is then undertaken. The concluding section draws together the various strands of evidence in order to assess the likelihood for success of the ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal. Overview of the ‘Poppies for Medicine’ Proposal The Senlis Council (2007) published the ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal in 2005. In the proposal the Afghan state would license village groups to cultivate opium poppies and process the extracted opium into morphine tablets, from which the state would produce medicine for domestic or foreign redistribution. Once licensed a village Shura 2 would 2 The Shura is a traditional dispute resolution mechanism operating in Afghanistan in which a council of elders interpret customary and Islamic laws passed down through generations. The Shura is found Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 4 allocate jobs within the village. Farmers, farm labourers, security guards, laboratory technicians and administrators would be hired and, if required, trained. The Shura would monitor and record the process by first estimating the amount of produce each farmer should yield from their land and then monitoring compliance with this estimation. If a farmer fails to produce the promised yield at harvest, without satisfactory explanation, this would indicate diversion. Any evidence of diversion by one village member would result in the rescission of the village license and possible criminal prosecution by the state and/or Shura against the individual. The Afghan National Police (ANP) would partner villagers in protecting their produce from external threats during cultivation, storage and transit. International development organizations would monitor the quality of produce. The Shura would be required to allocate an undefined percentage of all profits to the development of the village, in an attempt to diversify economic activity, with a long-term goal of ‘phasing out’ licit and illicit poppy cultivation. International development organizations would advise on strategic spending. The two primary objectives of the proposal are to reduce illicit opium production within Afghanistan and supply more affordable opiate-based painkillers to less-developed nations, in which there is a deficit of affordable opiate-based painkillers. The proposal for legal opium production in Afghanistan garnered a mixture of support and criticism (see, e.g., Attaran and Boozary, 2011; Fawthrop, 2005; The Lancet, 2005; Polanyi, 2006; Tanter, 2011) 3 from politicians, the media and academics. Policy analyst critiques have been based upon five general themes which shall be briefly summarized here (see Bhattacharji and Kamminga, 2010, for a defence of the criticisms). First, while around 90% of global medicinal opiates are consumed in North America and Europe, this reflects not a deficit of supply, as Senlis suggest, but rather inadequate access and demand from developing nations (Chouvy, 2008; Grare, 2008; INCB, 2008). Second, Afghan opium would have to compete with existing licit producers such as Australia, India and Turkey. Third, the initiation of such a project in the more secure areas of Afghanistan would likely cultivate resentment within the less secure areas, where poppy cultivation is at its highest. Fourth, licit within areas dominated by Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbecks. Similar mechanisms exist in Pashtun areas referred to as a Jirga. See Wardak, 2006. 3 For links to support for the proposal from western political parties and government committees see http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/P4M/support Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 5 opium cultivation is not a developmental panacea; the likely licit income would be lower than the current illicit income (Chouvy, 2008). Last, the Afghan state is not prepared for a ‘poppies for medicine’ industry. There is large scale conflict, instability, corruption and inefficiencies within the criminal justice and bureaucratic system (Felbab-Brown, 2007). Most importantly, Zulmay Afzali (2008), a spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, has agreed with many of these critiques stating that, if a global deficit did exist, then the major licit producers would have already filled it. The challenges of regulating opium production in insecure areas is also acknowledged, as is the potential for the proposal to increase conflict, stating that licensing a small number while eradicating the remainder of farmers’ crops would be an invitation to a return to civil war. It is not the intention of this paper to re-assess or reiterate these issues; however, some overlap is inevitable. Rather, it intends to evaluate the use of India and Turkey by Senlis as case studies in support of the overall proposal. An Introduction to the Indian and Turkish Opium Trades India and Turkey have long histories of supplying the market for both licit and illicit opium. Opium production in India was constrained, to a point, by strong bureaucratic and criminal justice mechanisms from 1799 onwards. The control process has improved its administrative and technological efficiency yet continues with the basic structure established in 1799. Unlicensed opium farming was prohibited and subject to stringent punishment. Opium poppy farmers were licensed to farm, and produce an amount demanded by, and sold only to, the state, at a fixed price. At the end of each season, the farmers transported produce to state opium agents for weighing and examination for adulterants. The opium would then be transported under armed guard to opium refining factories (Newman, 1989; Richards, 1981; Windle, 2011). Until 1936, the Indian export controls were often weak, sometimes deliberately so, resulting in opium being smuggled into countries which prohibited its importation, most notably China (Haq, 2000). The export controls currently conform to international regulations imposed by the Single Convention. Turkish opium suffered similarly weak export controls and supplied large illicit markets. However, Turkey never benefitted from the regulatory controls that had been Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 6 implemented in India by the British during colonial rule (Poroy, 1981). This meant that, until the early 1970s, Turkish opium was one of the primary sources for the global illicit opium and heroin markets (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953; INCB, 1971; Murphy and Steele, 1971; West, 1992). In response to international pressure, particularly from the United States (US), the government of Turkey first banned opium cultivation in 1971. The prohibition was dropped in 1974 in favour of a strict licensed control system, based upon the manufacture of poppy straw (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; Spain, 1975). As illustrated in Figure 1, since the 1980s India and Turkey have consistently been two of the leading suppliers of medicinal and scientific opium to the global market. India, during the 1970s exerted a near monopoly on the licit opium market (Haq, 2000).