The phenomenology of economics : life - world , formalism , and the invisible hand

What makes it so attractive to economists to be granted the rank of scientists? What role did political ideologies play in the scientification of economics? How could formal reasoning function so prominently in establishing scientific authority? And how is it that economists today hold considerable power in shaping social discourse although inside the profession the complaints about its irrelevance do not cease? This thesis tackles such issues surrounding the modern project of an economic science with a fresh look from phenomenology. In a grand narrative of the scientification of economics and a piecemeal biography of the mathematical economist Gerard Debreu, it tracks the relation of economics and the " life-world " —that is, economists' sensibility for problems and responsibility for answers. Dwelling upon Husserl's late philosophy, this thesis makes the case for the 'forgetfulness of the life-world': practicing economics, at least since the formalist revolution of the 1950s, makes economists insensible to the very motives for their practice, and irresponsible for their claims. Instead of envisioning a phenomenological economics, the thesis shows that this forgetfulness was necessary for the formation of economics as a science. It suggests a new tone of criticism away from the deploring of its present state. Today, the question is no longer 'Which economic science?', but 'When does it disappear?' Technically speaking, the thesis explores the " subjective constitution of economics " : What kind of person does one have to be in order to be interested in an economic science? What kind of character, or " ethos " , is induced by, or allowed to express itself in economics? What limits does the pursuit of scientific authority in economics impose on the conduct of an intellectual life? This approach is unique in the field of today's commentary on science. As opposed to traditional approaches in the philosophy of