Iran: Cultural Values, Self images and Negotiation Behavior

iii realism – a predilection towards “playing by ear” and keeping options open with and ability to juggle options and keep them all in the air. Many of these traits are popularly associated with the stereotype of the bazaar merchant (bazaari). On the other hand, the popular bazaari stereotype is replete with negative characteristics. He is seen as a wheeler-dealer, one capable of selling ice to the Eskimos. He prefers short-term profit to long-term advantages and confidence building; he is calculating, greedy, opportunistic, double-faced, dishonest, and manipulative and easily takes bribes (aptly called pour-cent or raant in modern Iranian Persian). Self-critical Iranians tend to ascribe these traits as well to “national characteristics”. At the same time, Iranian society is, at its roots, religious with widespread acceptance of popular superstition. Iranians today tend to characterize themselves as highly spiritual (rohani), in contrast to the materialistic West and Arab world. Iranian “Reformists” are not secular, and do not call for a total separation of religion and State. Even the Shah – despite the present regime’s propaganda – was a believing Shiite Muslim. This popular religiosity, however, stands in stark contrast to the low esteem in which Iranians hold their clergy and the extremely negative Persian stereotypes of the Mullah as corrupt, hypocritical, avaricious, lascivious, argumentative, and unscrupulous – a person who exploits religion for the sake of his own interests. These stereotypes are ingrained in Iranian lore for centuries and are not the consequence of disenchantment from the present regime. Both the “bazaar ethos” and the Shiite religious narrative of an oppressed minority are called upon to justify pragmatism. Shiite Islam provides defense mechanisms for survival: passive acceptance of political situations, dissimulation (ketman, taqiya) regarding their religious identity in order to stave off oppression, religious and cultural syncretism, and allowing for the absorption of non-indigenous practice, and – most important – ijtihad, the right of senior scholars to make innovative strategic religious decisions based on their own interpretation of the Koran, and not on legal precedent alone (as in Sunnite Islam). Consequently, heroic suicidal dogmatism is not a characteristic of Iranian political culture. Iran, as a nation, has responded to most threats in a pragmatic way, railing against the lack of justice in the way that stronger powers take advantage of their superior strength, but reacting according to a sober reading of the situation. Iranian negotiation techniques reflect many of the cultural traits noted above. Iranian negotiators are methodical and have demonstrated a high level of preparations and a detailed and legalistic attitude. On the other hand, their communication tends to be extremely high-context; ambiguous, allusive and indirect not only in the choice of words utilized, but in the dependence of the interpretation of the message on the context in which it is transmitted: non-verbal clues, staging and setting of the act of communication, and the choice of the bearer of the message. Procrastination is another key characteristic of Iranian negotiation techniques. This stands in sharp contrast to American style communication (Get to the point/Where's the beef?/ time is money!) which places a high value on using lowest common denominator language in order to ensure maximum and effective mutual understanding of the respective intents of both sides. This tendency has been explained by an aversion to an assumption that the longer the negotiations last, the greater a chance that things can change in his favor and an intrinsic Shiite belief in the virtue of patience. Iran: Cultural Values, Self-images and Negotiating Behavior iv Dissimulation, high-level disinformation and manipulation are widely acceptable. Western diplomats and go-betweens have lamented the fact that Iranian interlocutors were consistent in not maintaining their promises, and that oral statements or promises are often employed by Iranians pro-forma, just to get an interlocutor out of their hair, with no intention of carrying out what they have stated. The British Ambassador to Iran in the 1970s, Sir Dennis Wright, summarized his dealings with Iranians as follows: “The Iranians are people who say the opposite of what they think and do the opposite of what they say. That does not necessarily mean that what they do does not conform to what they think.” Iranian negotiators tend to accept frequent crisis as part of the negotiation process and seem relatively unconcerned by the prospect that such tactics may endanger the post-negotiation relationship. Insinuated threats, bluffing, and disinformation are all highly acceptable. Accordingly, the Iranian negotiator may not only be not offended by the use of these techniques by his foreign interlocutor, but may even hold a grudging admiration for the cleverness of his protagonist. In the light of the significance of Iranian nationalism in the Iranian mindset, it is not surprising that Iranians have had a certain difficulty in accepting a fellow Iranian as a bona fide counterpart who speaks in the name of the adversary. Similarly, Iranians tend to look askance at other Muslims who represent the West and to view emissaries of non-Caucasian origin (blacks, Asians) as less authentic representatives of the West. The ideological constraints of the present regime tend to create a preference for. The Iranian need for collective decision-making is especially evident in the treatment of back channels. Even in high-level meetings, Iranian negotiators will hold talks in the presence of an official interpreter or a clerical “commissar” as a silent witness. Iranian negotiators have been known to make extensive use of back channels and prenegotiations. In many cases, these channels seem to have been no more than a mechanism for gathering operational intelligence prior to the actual negotiations. Often, though, these channels seem to be in competition with each other or to represent different interest groups within the Iranian leadership, or different people in the close vicinity of the highest leadership who want to be the ones to bring a “prize” to the leadership. A frequent negotiating ploy used by Iranians is to go off on a tangent into “virtual negotiations” on new and unexpected issues, which become the focal point of the talks. The non-Iranian side finds itself compelled to negotiate back to the original issue, and then finds that it has paid for the return to status quo ante. This seems to be meant to wear out the adversary and to learn his weaknesses before raising real issues, but it also may be a reflection of the “bazaar instinct” and the “love of the game,” a demonstration of rhetorical, emotional, and intellectual virtuosity in negotiation that raises the status of the Iranian in the eyes of his colleagues and subordinates, and hence serves a social end, separate from the real goal of the negotiations.