On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
نویسنده
چکیده
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the deferred acceptance rule to satisfy a consistency principle. In this note we extend this result to the domain of substitutable priorities, complementing results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009). JEL classification: D63, C78.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 62 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011