China’s Nuclear Export Controls: Policy and Regulations

China has moved up a steep learning curve on nuclear proliferation since it joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. Beijing has stated repeatedly that it opposes nuclear proliferation and will not help any country develop nuclear weapons. In 1992, it acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after more than 20 years of criticism. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that although China has embraced the norms and principles of nonproliferation, there is still a gap between its general nonproliferation posture and its export practice. As it promotes international nuclear cooperation with other countries, China must decide how to balance international nuclear trade with export control. As a nuclear weapons state, China’s nuclear resources, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities set it apart from other emerging nuclear suppliers. China needs Western civilian nuclear technology for its nuclear energy program, but its export of enriched uranium, heavy water, research reactors, and other sensitive technology has caused proliferation concerns. To strengthen overall implementation of the nonproliferation regime, the international community must integrate China into the existing supply-side control system. International supply-side restraints are based on effective national export control systems. In order to fulfill its international nonproliferation commitments, Beijing needs to strengthen its export control system and adjust its nuclear export practice to international standards. This paper will discuss China’s policy in nuclear exports and its attitude toward international supplyside restraints. Also, by comparing China’s controls to those of other nuclear suppliers, it will attempt to characterize the current Chinese export control system and to identify major weaknesses in that system. EXPLAINING CHINA’S NUCLEAR EXPORTS