Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Economies with Uncertain Delivery
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. All trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. Agents buy lists of bundles that give them the right to receive one of the bundles. With rational expectations, that is, knowledge of the selection mechanism, agents can predict which bundle will be delivered in each state of nature, and thus equate the utility of the list with the utility of this bundle. We show by counter-example that rational expectations equilibrium may fail to exist. We also show that a perfectly informed trader with arbitrarily small endowments is enough to guarantee existence of a rational expectations equilibrium.
منابع مشابه
Subjective Expectations Equilibrium in Economies with Uncertain Delivery
We develop a model of general equilibrium with trade ex ante in a context of private and incomplete state verification. Instead of choosing bundles, agents choose lists of bundles out of which the market then selects one bundle for delivery. With agents having subjective expectations about the bundle that will be delivered, we study existence of a subjective expectations equilibrium.
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