NOTA DI LAVORO 83 . 2009 Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to totally recursive-balanced partition function form games we in...

Endogenous Network Dynamics NOTA DI LAVORO

In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open que...

NOTA DI LAVORO 83 . 2010 Improving Education as Key to Enhancing Adaptive Capacity in Developing Countries

NOTA DI LAVORO 76 . 2009 Environmentalists ' Behaviour and Environmental Policies

In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries’ environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environ...

Dynamics , Stability , and Foresight in the Shapley - Scarf Housing Market NOTA DI LAVORO 51 . 2009

While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. M...