'A Brute to the Brutes?': Descartes' Treatment of Animals

To be able to believe that a dog with a broken paw is not really in pain when it whimpers is a quite extraordinary achievement even for a philosopher. Yet according to the standard interpretation, this is just what Descartes did believe. He held, we are informed, the 'monstrous' thesis that 'animals are without feeling or awareness of any kind'.1 The standard view has been reiterated in a recent collection on animal rights, which casts Descartes as the villain of the piece for his alleged view that animals merely behave 'as if they feel pain when they are, say, kicked or stabbed'.2 The basis for this widely accepted interpretation is Descartes' famous doctrine of the 'animal machine' ('bete-machine'); a doctrine that one critic condemns as 'a grim foretaste of a mechanically minded age' which 'brutally violates the old kindly fellowship of living things'.3 But if we look at what Descartes actually says about animals it is by no means clear that he holds the monstrous view which all the com-