Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologismproofness property. Equilibrium allocations satisfying this property are characterized in terms of the players’ incentive and participation constraints and can be computed using standard methods. ∗We would like to thank the co-editor Jeff Ely and three anonymous referees for very useful comments that helped improve the paper. Financial Support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) through SFB/TR 15 “Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems” and by the National Science Foundation through grant 0922365 is gratefully acknowledged. †Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. Email: [email protected]. ‡Department of Economics, University of Mannheim. Email: [email protected].
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