A theory of voting in large elections

A Study of Factors that Influenced Voters’ Behaviour: A Case of Billiri Local Government (2019 General Elections)

An Analysis of the Influence of Radio Political Campaign Messages on Voters’ Electoral Behavior in Kano, Nigeria

This paper will examine the influence of radio political campaign messages on the electorates’ voting behavior in Kano – Nigeria, with a focus on the 2015 general elections. It seeks to ascertain the extent that the electorates in Kano – Nigeria were exposed to radio political campaign messages, as well as the extent to which such messages influenced their voting decisions. Equally, the study c...

On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible in a large election (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4, 5, 6], among others). We find that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large voting games with Poisson population unce...

Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections

We propose a game theoretic model of large elections that incorporates the assumption that mandate matters. This innovation is motivated by empirical evidence that US Representatives with larger victory margins on average vote in a more partisan manner. Without relying on preference for voting, this new model predicts strictly positive limiting turnout rates in a costly voting environment as th...

Why Do Rational People Vote in Large Elections with Costs to Vote?

Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve this paradox of not voting and may even aggravate it. However, if the possibility of a decisive vote comes to mind, expected utility maximizers will doubt their preference for abstention and greatly overes...