Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills
نویسندگان
چکیده
We develop an approach which escapes Arrow’s impossibility by relying on information about agents’ indi¤erence curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di¤erent preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and equal access to resources for all preferences.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 24 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005