Conceptual Truth Defended
نویسنده
چکیده
Since (2) and (3) entail that someone could have justified true belief but no knowledge, we may conclude that knowledge cannot be justified true belief. In much the same vein, Davidson (1987, 47) devises his swampman-scenario to convince us that historical properties are essential for meaning, and Searle (1984) intends his story of the Chinese room to make us see that understanding is not reducible to symbol-manipulation.1 Scenario-based reasoning bears all the marks of an a priori procedure, or so it seems. Our entitlement (if any) to hold (3) on the basis of contemplating Gettier’s cases does not seem to be grounded in experience. (3) seems subject neither to empirical support nor to empirical refutation. By contrast, our entitlement to believe counterfactuals such
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